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On November 30, 2009, North Korea announced a reform 
to replace all currency in circulation with new bills and coins. 
North Korean officials have made no bones about their moti-
vations: The “reform” constitutes a direct attack on the emerg-
ing market economy and the independence from state control 
that it represents. In an interview following the conversion, 
an official of the North Korean central bank noted that the 
reform was aimed at curbing private trade and underlined that 
North Korea is “not moving toward a free market economy 
but will further strengthen the principle and order of socialist 
economic management.” 
Without doubt the currency reform will reduce the well-
being of the North Korean population at a time when the 
country is already struggling with economic stagnation, spiral-
ing prices, and a return of chronic food shortages. The open 
questions are two: Will the government ultimately be forced 
to adjust its strategy or will it persist in enforcing the new 
antimarket course of action? The New Year’s joint editorial of 
prominent official news organs, an important statement of 
the government’s policy intentions, conveys a mixed message 
consisting  largely  of  blather  about  revolutionary  upswing; 
it does not even mention the currency reform—potentially 
signaling a lack of resolve in carrying it out. The second ques-
tion is whether the discontent this new government action has 
sown will have implications for the country’s political stabil-
ity. Preliminary signs suggest the regime is leaving nothing to 
chance and that heightened repression is a central feature of 
the new economic controls. 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LOGIC OF 
CURRENCY REFORMS
Currency reforms are not a bad thing in principle and have 
been  used  by  governments  that  have  tamed  inflation  and 
wish to distance themselves from past policy mistakes. These 
reforms typically knock zeros off the old currency and issue new 
paper, often at approximate parity to major currencies such as 
the dollar or the euro. The reform acts as a precommitment 
mechanism. By making the country’s relative macroeconomic 
performance more transparent through the new exchange rate 
peg, citizens can more easily hold the government accountable. 
Such a move may help break lingering inflationary expecta-
tions and contribute to maintaining price stability, although 
. Kang I-ruk, “‘Currency Exchange Measure: Purpose Is to Protect Working 
People’s Interests, to Stabilize, Improve Their Living’—We Hear From Cho 
So’ng-hyo’n, Senior Staff Member of the Central Bank—‘Material Ground 
Laid for Fighting Off Inflation,’” Choso’n Sinbo Online, December 4, 2009 [in 
Korean]. 
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future inflation is ultimately a function of maintaining stable 
monetary and fiscal policy.2 The overall price level should fall 
instantaneously by the magnitude of the redenomination, but 
relative prices should not be affected. Apart from these macro-
economic considerations, proponents of currency reform have 
also claimed cost savings based on eased data entry, improved 
software compatibility, and the convenience of more manage-
able currency denominations. 
Normally, a transparent conversion process is announced 
in advance and places no limits on conversion; citizens and 
businesses are allowed to convert all the old currency they 
have at the stipulated rate of exchange. The announcement 
would include a date at which the old currency ceases to be 
legal tender, accounting rules to govern the transition, and 
other  practical  measures  to  implement  the  changeover.  In 
recent years countries such as Turkey, Romania, and Ghana 
have all successfully implemented such reforms. In Ghana, 
for example, the government began a campaign to inform the 
public of the impending change seven months in advance, and 
both the old and new currencies circulated in parallel for six 
months to allow adequate time for the changeover before the 
old currency ceased to be accepted as legal tender.
The  North  Korean  case  differs  from  this  conventional 
approach in a number of crucial respects. The currency reform 
was sprung without warning; the public was given only days 
to convert their holdings. Most critically, it included confisca-
tory limits on the ability of citizens to convert their currency 
holdings. Not all old currency could be exchanged for new. 
One motivation for the reform was to control inflation. 
The confiscation of “excess” cash means that the money supply 
actually contracts, in the case at hand by a potentially large 
amount. Unless the velocity of money increases to offset the 
monetary  contraction,  the  level  of  economic  activity  also 
falls.3 Indeed, if the monetary contraction is sufficiently large 
2. The logic of such conversions is, in part, psychological. A standard currency 
reform requires citizens to exchange notes with high—and in some cases very 
high—nominal values for notes with lower denominations. This conversion 
makes goods and services appear more affordable even if there is no change in 
the real price level. 
3. In principle, the central bank should know the amount of currency in cir-
culation and hence how much of the money supply would be destroyed—0 
the economy could temporarily experience deflation. As in the 
standard case, however, if the underlying drivers such as the 
state’s resort to the printing presses are not addressed, inflation 
will once again take hold; there is already evidence that this 
will prove a problem. 
Confiscatory currency reforms are a form of asset redis-
tribution, or more accurately, asset leveling. Such conversions 
either tax those with excess cash balances (if they can be depos-
ited in bank accounts on unfavorable terms and subsequently 
withdrawn) or destroy “excess” cash wealth altogether. In the 
North Korean case, this last motive appears central: Currency 
reform was designed to target groups engaged in market activi-
ties that not only generate cash earnings but also require cash 
balances given the underdevelopment of the North Korean 
financial system, while at the same time providing compen-
satory allocations to favored groups closely connected to the 
state.4 This distributional motivation—to punish enemies and 
reward supporters—is reminiscent of reforms undertaken in 
2002 (Noland 2004).
The effects of these confiscatory measures are twofold. 
First,  they  will  increase  the  risk  premium  on  engaging  in 
market-based economic activity, both increasing the prices of 
goods and services as well as decreasing their availability. It has 
been reported that even some high priority housing construc-
tion in the capital has ground to a halt amid the chaos. 
Second, the reform provides a disincentive to hold the 
domestic currency and, in the long run, will encourage further 
dollarization  of  the  economy.  The  government  preemp-
tively banned the use of foreign currencies on December 28. 
Successful implementation of this prohibition will require an 
extraordinary degree of repression.
These disincentives to economic activity and to holding 
the domestic currency (assuming the ban on foreign curren-
cies does not stick) will make it increasingly difficult for the 
percent? 0 percent? 90 percent?—given the limits on conversion. Whether it 
was consulted or whether the ultimate decision maker even knew enough to 
ask the question is unknown, but the shifts in the conversion limits discussed 
below suggest strongly that the government had not anticipated the economic 
and social reaction to the reform.
4. As described in an interview with a North Korean central bank official, 
“If the measure were made known in advance, that would have provided a 
leeway of time for illegal money to be transformed into legal money.” Kang 
I-ruk, “‘Currency Exchange Measure: Purpose Is to Protect Working People’s 
Interests, to Stabilize, Improve Their Living’—We Hear From Cho So’ng-
hyo’n, Senior Staff Member of the Central Bank—‘Material Ground Laid for 
Fighting Off Inflation,’” Choso’n Sinbo Online, December 4, 2009 [in Korean].
. Although normally a state activity, such construction is, in fact, dependent 
on state-owned firms now reluctant to part with supplies as well as private en-
trepreneurs who were financing and purchasing the units and are now without 
resources. Lee Myung-ho, “Currency Reform Halts More than 30 Percent of 
Pyongyang’s Housing Constructions [sic],” Open News for North Korea 26, 
December 27, 2009.
The North Korean currency reform 
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state to finance its activities and thus reinforce, not diminish, 
inflationary tendencies.  
A  final  related  motive—the  flip  side  of  discouraging 
private activity—is to revive the socialist sector. To the extent 
that the currency reform destroys private wealth and discour-
ages market activity, it pushes workers back into the socialist 
sector. The one semi-official announcement of the reform is 
worth quoting at some length on this point: “Denying specu-
lation that this [currency reform] action is a step in the direc-
tion of a free-market economy, responsible official Cho So’ng-
hyo’n stressed that socialist principles and order will be far 
more solidly cemented in the managing of the economy. He 
also expressed his opinion that the market’s role will gradually 
dwindle as the state’s economic capacity is enhanced as more 
domestically produced commodities are distributed through 
state-run networks for commerce.”6 
THE CONTEXT: STATE VERSUS MARKET
The famine of the mid-990s triggered a profound “marketiza-
tion from below” of the North Korean economy (Haggard and 
Noland 2007). Households, work units, local-party organs, 
government offices, and even military units scrambled for food 
and in doing so initiated barter and trade and ventured into 
new, monetized economic activities. In a 2008 survey of 300 
North Korean refugees living in South Korea, nearly three-
quarters  reported  involvement  in  market-oriented  activities 
(Haggard and Noland 2009a). A surprising 69 percent of all 
respondents said that they secured over 0 percent of their 
income from private business activities, and 46 percent said 
they secured all of their income from private activities. 
At the peak of the famine and in its immediate aftermath 
the regime had little choice but to acquiesce in these develop-
ments and in 2002 it initiated a major economic reform. The 
details of this reform go beyond our purposes here, but it is 
worth noting that even this reform had elements that under-
mined incentives to private activity. The reform is also impor-
tant because it corresponded with, and probably contributed 
to, inflationary pressures in the economy, which have been an 
ongoing concern. 
One objective of the reform was to change administered 
relative prices and wages in an attempt to align them with 
underlying scarcities. For example, food prices were sharply 
increased in an effort to reduce the extent of government subsi-
dies and to encourage production. Certain classes of favored 
workers also enjoyed larger wage increases than others. 
6. Kang I-ruk, “New Currency Issued in the DPRK: Currency Exchange Work 
in Progress—‘Policy to Benefit Hard-Working Workers’ Hailed by Majority of 
People,” Choso’n Sinbo Online, December 4, 2009 [in Korean].
But the North Korean reforms did not simply alter rela-
tive wages and prices; they also raised the overall price level by 
roughly ,000 percent. A sympathetic interpretation of this 
change in the price level is that the North Korean authorities 
feared “monetary overhang.” Since the North Korean economy 
had shrunk so dramatically during the previous decade, citizens 
held large amounts of cash. This kind of involuntary savings 
often  occurs  in  socialist  systems  in  which  workers  receive 
wages in the absence of adequate consumer goods. Authorities 
may have feared that once the economy began to marketize, 
prices would rise as accumulated cash began chasing the goods 
that were on offer. Under this interpretation, the government 
engineered the increase in prices in a way that would reinforce 
the desired changes in real incomes for favored groups. 
However,  a  less  sympathetic  interpretation  is  that  the 
price increase was targeted at the class of traders and black 
marketeers that had sprung up since the famine. Since this 
group maintains large cash holdings in order to run their busi-
nesses, the huge jump in the overall price level would have the 
effect of destroying the value of their working capital; in this 
regard, the government-engineered change in the price level 
bears a certain resemblance to the 2009 currency reform. 
Good  economywide  estimates  of  North  Korean  infla-
tion do not exist, but one way of inferring inflation rates is 
through the black market exchange rate. Fragmentary data 
indicate that in the three years after August 2002, the black 
market  exchange  rate  of  the  North  Korean  won  depreci-
ated against the US dollar at a relatively steady rate of 7 to 
9 percent monthly, or at an annualized rate of 30 to 40 
percent. Since inflation in the United States over this period 
has been trivial in comparison, this indicator suggests that 
North Korea experienced ongoing inflation well in excess of 
00 percent a year in the three years following the July 2002 
policy changes. It appears that by 2007 the rate of inflation 
reduced to low double- or even single-digit levels but then 
possibly reaccelerated as the economy came under multiple 
stresses in 2008–09.
Beginning in 200, the government began to abandon 
the reforms and revert to more direct controls in an effort to 
revive the socialist sector, limit the sphere of private activity, 
and control inflation (Haggard and Noland 2009a, 2009b; 
Park 2009). An early indication of this new direction was the 
decision in August 200 to reinstate the public distribution 
system (PDS) and to ban private trading in grain. As in the 
past, the ability of the government to implement this policy 
varied across the country, and eventually the government was 
forced to quietly shelve the policy. But such moves intensified 
again in the wake of floods in 2006 and particularly 2007. 
The government increased food production quotas, including N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
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through exactions earmarked for the military. Authorities also 
cracked down on “embezzlement” and “corruption” on the 
part of cooperative managers and placed new restrictions on 
private plots and cooperative leasing of land to redirect effort 
back into cooperative work. Along with the weather and global 
price increases, this reversion to state controls no doubt played 
some role in the rapid inflation in food prices in 2008 and the 
most serious shortages since the famine of the mid-990s. 
The recent effort to exercise control over the market has 
not been limited to the food economy but has included a 
wider assault on market activity; table  provides an overview 
of some of the more important control measures instituted in 
2008 and 2009, including those targeting cross-border move-
ment from the so-called National Border Area in the counties 
adjacent to China. The antimarket campaigns began with the 
imposition of escalating age restrictions on market traders in 
the fall of 2007, ultimately banning women under 40 from 
trading  in  general  markets.  From  mid-January  2008  the 
government stepped up inspections on the general markets, or 
jangmadang, in an effort to control the range of goods offered, 
with the intention of reverting to the more limited farmers’ 
markets that were permitted to trade only in supplementary 
foodstuffs.  In  November  2008,  North  Korean  authorities 
ordered all permanent markets to open only once every 0 
days, reverting to the farmers’ market format. In addition to 
a variety of efforts to control the smaller markets, the govern-
ment also focused increasing attention on the development of 
a major wholesale market in Pyongsung, which, because of its 
strategic location between Sinuiju and Pyongyang, had effec-
tively become the distribution center for the entire country. In 
June 2009, this market was closed down. 
It is important to underline that these efforts at control 
were not necessarily successful. Age restrictions were circum-
vented by bringing grandparents into the market, and some 
accommodation  was  ultimately  made  to  allow  for  women 
experiencing  hardship  to  trade.  Regulated  markets—and 
efforts to close them—gave rise to “alley markets” that shifted 
trading to new venues. The closing of the wholesale market 
at Pyongsung similarly shifted activity to new cities includ-
ing Soochun. Traders undoubtedly bribe inspectors as well. 
Nonetheless, there can be little question that the period in the 
run-up to the currency conversion has been one of tightening 
controls on market activity.
These controls have extended to cross-border trade (table 
). The dramatic increase in trade with China has resulted in 
the creation of dense business networks that include major 
Chinese and North Korean enterprises, smaller Chinese and 
North Korean businesses, and North Koreans with relatives 
in China who are permitted to travel, albeit only with the 
greatest of difficulty. As a result, the border poses profound 
challenges to the North Korean leadership. When economic 
circumstances  deteriorate,  the  incentives  rise  to  move  into 
China either permanently or in search of business opportu-
nities and food. With this movement comes leakage in the 
government’s  monopoly  on  information  about  the  outside 
world. Cross-border trade has also come to include an array of 
communication and cultural products that directly undermine 
the government’s monopoly on information: from small tele-
visions capable of receiving Chinese broadcasts in border areas 
to South Korean videos and DVDs and even mobile phones.
Larger trading entities in the land ports along the border, 
particularly in Sinuiju, have fallen under greater government 
scrutiny.  In  a  noteworthy  development  in  April  2008,  the 
central government dispatched a team of 200 investigators to 
Sinuiju in the name of an Antisocialist Conscience Investigation 
to inspect the books of foreign trade organizations, necessarily 
affecting trade and market activity as a result. From Novem-
ber 2007, reports of ad hoc antisocialist investigations become 
more frequent in the border areas, targeting illegal internal 
movement,  contraband,  and  cross-border  trade  and  move-
ment (table ). The most dramatic signal sent by the regime 
was the public execution of  people, 3 of them women, in 
Onsung on February 20, 2008, on charges of trafficking. But 
sentences have also been increased; single border crossings not 
related to South Korea or having political overtones that were 
previously overlooked now carry sentences of three years, with 
those found guilty of multiple crossings—even if not politi-
cal—receiving sentences of up to 0 years.
CURRENCY REFORM NORTH KOREA STYLE
Since 200, the evidence of a turn away from reform has been 
ample. The currency reform marks only the most recent turn 
of the screw. It is not even the country’s first confiscatory 
currency reform; the shadow of potential expropriation hangs 
over all private activity in the economy.7 
7. Early currency reforms at the time of independence replaced banknotes is-
sued during the colonial period. In February 99, the government undertook 
The repression surrounding the 
currency conversion is part of a 
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There are several obvious barriers to understanding how 
the present reform transpired. The reporting to which we have 
access traces back to a relatively limited number of sources. 
Official sources have largely remained silent on the reform; 
although embassies in Pyongyang were briefed verbally, the 
regime initially felt no need to provide an explanation of its 
actions to outsiders. A small number of South Korean sources 
(Goodfriends’ North Korea Today; the newspaper Daily NK; 
the  Network  for  North  Korean  Democracy  and  Human 
Rights’ NK In & Out; and Open News for North Korea) main-
tain  networks  within  North  Korea,  and  Chinese-language 
a second currency reform to curb inflation caused by the 90–3 Korean War 
and to provide the government with investment resources for postwar rehabili-
tation. Like the current currency reform, the exchange rate was set to 00: 
but with no limit on the amount exchanged. A third conversion took place in 
April 979. In July 992, a fourth conversion set the exchange rate at : but 
required that funds exceeding the conversion limit of 300 won be deposited 
and could only be withdrawn over some period of time (,000 won in three 
years, 0,000 in five years, the remainder in 0 years). In fact, deposits were 
only partially honored or not honored at all, with the consequence that the 
exchange did not only involve forced savings but was effectively confiscatory as 
well; reports suggest some depositors received nothing. See NK In & Out No. 
22, December 2, 2009, at www.nknet.org/eng.
press offers some insights through the lens of border trade. 
However, early reports suggest substantial confusion on the 
part of North Koreans reporting on the reforms, and there 
is  mounting  evidence  that  the  North  Korean  government 
has been forced to modify the terms of the reform as it has 
unfolded. In sum, the usual caveats of dealing with North 
Korea pertain. 
For  obvious  reasons,  a  confiscatory  currency  reform 
requires significant planning, high levels of secrecy, and must 
be executed all at once.8 New bills must be printed and distrib-
uted  in  advance.  If  individuals  and  households  have  prior 
information, they will convert currency into commodities or 
foreign exchange. Control of information is therefore required. 
Individuals, households, and private entities will also seek to 
8. It has been reported that on November 27 authorities made surprise 
inspections of customs houses, state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, 
in some cases seizing inventory (Jung Kwon-ho, “Crackdown on Exporters 
ahead of Redenomination Revealed,” Daily NK, December , 2009). It has 
been claimed that the black market value of the won dropped dramatically 
at the same time, though if correct, it is unclear whether this was a reaction 
to the state’s action or due to word of the planned currency reform leaking in 
advance. 
Table 1     Controls on market activity, foreign trade, and border crossing, 2008–09
Date Type of control
January 008 Women under 0 banned from trading in markets, followed by efforts to redeploy them to workplaces. 
April 008 Wide-ranging Antisocialist Conscience Investigation of Sinuiju, the country’s main land port with China, including the books of 
trading organizations. Restrictions placed on carrying merchandise on bicycles and carts in Sinuiju. 
July 008 Party, police, and market management office coordinate efforts to limit large sales in the Pyongsung market, an emerging whole-
sale center for the country in Pyongan province. 
October 008 Nationwide ban on sale of shoes in markets and new restrictions limiting trade in foodstuffs to individually cultivated fruits and 
vegetables. 
November 008 Major directive announcing the conversion of markets back to the more restrictive farmers’ market format as of January 1, 009. 
Markets to be open only on the 1st, 11th, and 1st of each month, and to be limited to retail sales of individually cultivated food; 
other foodstuffs and manufactures to be sold through the PDS and state-run stores. Major cities, including Pyongyang, Hamheung, 
Soochun, Kaesung, and Chungjin, set up model farmers’ markets.
January 009 Full restructuring of farmers’ markets postponed for six months.
National Security Agency special investigative unit scrutinizes names, number of family members, and livelihoods of households 
in the National Border Area suspected of involvement in border crossing and trade. Public education campaigns and increased 
punishment for border crossing. 
March 009 New controls over lodging and movement without passes in National Border Area. 
March 009 Imposition of strict movement controls in connection with the Supreme People’s Assembly elections; intensified controls following 
the elections. 
May 009 Announcement of “10-day campaign” accompanied by renewed implementation of market restrictions on women under 0 and 
restricted items, including products of joint ventures, industrial goods, and American and Korean products. Punishment of emer-
gent back-alley markets and “sell and run” sales. Public education campaigns against market activities. 
June 009 Closure of Pyongsung market in Pyongan province.
July 009 Increased control and surveillance over households in National Border Area with defectors. 
August 009 Public education campaign against excessive luggage associated with long-distance trade. 
Central Party Investigative Group scrutinizes officials in the National Border Area suspected of illegal activities. 
Source: Research Institute for North Korean Society, North Korea Today No. 00, October 009.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
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circumvent conversion limits once they are announced. For 
example, households holding excess cash will seek to distrib-
ute it to those not bound by the limits by offering them a share 
of the new currency received; naturally, the government has an 
interest in limiting such transactions. 
The  dissemination  of  information  on  the  conversion 
passed through party channels.9 Provincial-level party officials 
were trained and then Party Committee secretaries and cadres 
in each city and county were convened on the morning of 
November 30, informed of the plan and given instructions 
about how to announce the new rules and address any objec-
tions; the justification for the reform was that it constituted 
a necessary measure on the way to the creation of a “strong 
and prosperous nation” by 202, the hundredth anniversary 
of Kim Il Sung’s birth. The plan was announced later in the 
morning to the public by party cadres to People’s Committees, 
neighborhood office chiefs, and chairpersons of People’s Units 
for dissemination down to the inminban level, the smallest 
unit of community organization. Announcements were also 
made at work units and subsequently broadcast through the 
so-called third broadcasting, the colloquial name for munici-
pal broadcasting networks that disseminate information and 
propaganda through speakers installed in homes, farms, and 
public buildings.0
The design of the conversion was to remove two zeros from 
the existing currency: A ,000-won note would be replaced 
with a 0-won note. However, the government initially set a 
00,000-won limit on what each household could convert. 
How much money did this initial limit represent? Formal-
9. North Korea Today No. 30, December 2009. 
0. Because of the difficulty of synchronizing the announcements perfectly 
and the need to control information on the exchange, all telephone lines ap-
pear to have been cut on the day of the conversion although it is possible that 
they simply crashed from a spike in traffic.
. An extremely important issue suggested in a number of accounts has to 
do with exempt classes. College students were allowed to convert 30,000 won 
each, on the assumption that they required some savings to live. Military 
personnel and elite workers also appeared to have separate limits and a major 
issue—although impossible to gauge—is the implicit exemption enjoyed by 
corrupt party officials privy to private information about the conversion. “At 
[sic] November 30,  AM, Currency Change Announced,” NK In & Out No. 
22, December 2, 2009 at www.nknet.org/eng.
sector monthly wages for most North Koreans fall within a 
range of 4,000 to 0,000 won a month, suggesting that the 
limit for conversion was equivalent to 0 to 2 months of 
wages, a fairly substantial amount of cash to hold on hand. 
As we have seen above, however, most households are engaged 
in other market activities, with the result that actual incomes 
are higher than formal-sector wages would suggest. Moreover, 
given the absence of trustworthy financial intermediaries or 
institutions for providing credit, even households with modest 
engagement in trade maintain larger cash balances than might 
otherwise be the case. Consider, for example, a trader with a 
very small inventory of rice: a single, 0-kilo sack. At the retail 
prices prevailing at the time of the reform, about ,700 won 
per kilo, the value of this small inventory would be 8,000 
won or nearly the entire limit. Households also save to smooth 
consumption of basic necessities over the crop cycle given the 
failure of the PDS to provide adequate rations. 
Another  way  of  gauging  the  limit  is  to  look  at  black 
market exchange rates. At the official exchange rate, the limit 
amounted to about $740 ($=3 won). But at a preconver-
sion black market won-dollar exchange rate of roughly 3,00, 
this limit was approximately $30. In short, by virtually any 
metric the conversion limit appears quite low and probably hit 
a fairly wide swath of the population. 
The new currency was not available at the time of the 
announcement; residents were required to make the conver-
sion by December 6, after which the old currency would be 
rendered worthless.2 In the interim, commercial transactions 
were officially limited on the assumption that goods would 
need to be repriced. The result was panicked efforts to dump 
rapidly depreciating old won in favor of tangible goods or 
foreign exchange. Reports during the week of the conversion 
describe the prices of grain and other foodstuffs skyrocket-
ing and the currency plummeting on the black market. One 
report from the middle of the conversion period suggested an 
exchange rate of 400,000 won to the dollar on December  
in Sinuiju.3
2. On December 4, the new currency went into circulation. North Korean 
currency now features ,000, 2,000, ,000, 00, 200, 00, 0, 0, and  won 
bills, plus a  won coin, and 0, 0, , and  jeon coins. On the ,000, 2,000, 
,000, 00, 200, and 00 won and  jeon and  jeon coins, “Juche 97, 2008” 
is printed as the issuing year, while the 0, 0, and  won bills and the  won 
and 0 and 0 jeon coins carry the imprint of “Juche 9, 2002,” suggesting 
that a currency reform has been contemplated for some time, somewhat 
undercutting the notion that it was undertaken in response to inflation experi-
enced since the 2002 reforms. 
3. An interesting question is why sellers would accept currency that within 
days would be declared worthless. One possibility is that they expected the 
policy to be rescinded or conversion ceilings to be raised, increasing the future 
value of the money. Another would be that they had ways of circumventing 
the conversion limits. A third is that they expected that the old currency would 
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There is increasing evidence that the authorities did not 
anticipate  the  depth  of  the  reaction  to  the  announcement 
nor a number of practical problems that were to ensue. As 
a result, a number of changes in the original policy followed 
in short—and confusing—succession, mainly increasing the 
conversion limits subject to certain conditions.4 
Viewed over the long run, the printing of more money 
than that required by the conversion could have a small silver 
lining. Despite the tremendous disruption of the reform and 
the loss of output in the short run, its effect might not prove 
lasting. Those with entrepreneurial talents have seen a loss 
in wealth but will no doubt seek to rebuild their savings by 
reverting to form and reengaging in private activity. The print-
ing of additional currency would, ironically, offset some of 
the contraction of the money supply and lubricate this return 
to the status quo ante. But this assumes that the government 
will allow this revival of the market to occur unimpeded, and 
as we have seen, the conversion has been both preceded and 
accompanied by the imposition of a variety of new controls.
The currency reform was only the first stage of a wider 
set  of  policy  changes.  Following  the  finalization  of  the 
reform, meetings were scheduled in Pyongyang for economic 
continue to function as a medium of exchange. At one point in post-Saddam 
Iraq, due to the high rate of inflation, the old “Saddam notes”—which were 
no longer being printed and hence were in fixed supply—actually traded at a 
premium to the new Iraqi dinar. On the black market exchange rate, see North 
Korea Today No. 309, December 2009.
4. Following the initial announcement of a 00,000 won conversion rate, 
a new decree was promulgated the next day that allowed for conversion of 
0,000 won at the new rate and permitted conversion or deposit of excess 
funds up to 200,000 won at the rate of ,000:, or one-tenth of the standard 
rate. Authorities subsequently allowed for the deposit of up to 00,000 won 
but at terms (with respect to the exchange rate, ability to draw on the funds, 
or interest paid) that were unclear. Given the fact that the conversion was 
transparently aimed to confiscate excess cash balances, the incentives to take 
up the conversion or deposit of excess balances were undoubtedly limited; an 
individual would immediately identify himself as someone with “excess” paper 
wealth. 
   Limits on conversion were subsequently raised again by stipulating that 
in addition to 00,000 won, households could also exchange up to 0,000 
won for each household member; an average household could thus exchange 
20,000 or 300,000. Still later in the month, exchange limits drifted up to 
300,000 then 00,000 old won per person, with deposits of up to  million 
won allowed if the sources of the funding could be explained. See, in par-
ticular, “Endless Confusion from Bad Policy” and “Sources Report Currency 
Reform Causing Discontent,” Daily NK, December 4; North Korea Today No. 
307/308, December 2009; North Korea Reform Radio, “North Korea Cur-
rency Reform Analysis Report,” December 2, 2009; and “DPRK Authorities 
Easing Redenomination Caps, Offering ‘Relief Money’ in Agitated Bid To 
Reduce Citizens’ Dissatisfaction,” Asahi Shimbun, December 27, 2009 [in 
Japanese].
. “Meeting on New Bills Scheduled,” Daily NK, December 7, 2009; Park 
In-ho, “New Industry and Real Estate Laws Enacted,” Daily NK, 6 Decem-
ber 2009; Kim Hyun, “N. Korea Establishes New Economic Laws Following 
Currency Change,” Yonhap News Agency, December 6, 2009.
cadres and managers to address the question of repricing and 
wages. In principle, a currency conversion does not involve 
any change in relative prices and wages: All prices and wages 
should simply adjust by the amount of the redenomination. If 
rice was trading at 2,000 won per kilo prior to the reform, it 
should cost 20 won per kilo after the conversion. As in 2002, 
however, the authorities were attempting a change not only 
in the price level but also in the structure of relative prices. 
Ideally for the regime, this would occur by eradicating the 
market  and  forcing  producers  and  consumers  to  transact 
entirely through state-controlled channels, where prices and 
wages  can  be  set  by  fiat.  On  December  9,  detailed  price 
guidelines were disseminated. Given the high share of food in 
household expenditures, the prices of rice have been the focus 
of substantial coverage. The guidelines accommodated market 
prices by raising staple prices higher than they had been prior 
to the reform.6 Rice, which was trading from ,700 to 2,000 
won prior to the reform, was repriced at 22 to 23 new won, 
no doubt reflecting an interest on the part of the government 
to induce greater supply. In reality, it proved impossible for 
the government to move all goods through official channels or 
to control prices, and official guidelines subsequently had to 
be adjusted in the wake of ongoing inflationary pressures and 
inadequate supply.7 
Critically,  wage  policies  were  introduced  that  favored 
certain groups. The Choso’n Sinbo, a Japanese Korean–language 
publication that reliably reflects official policy, reported on 
December 4 that “salaries for workers in factories and Party 
sub-organizations will be guaranteed at the same level as previ-
ously.”8 If this were correct—that workers would receive the 
same salaries as in the past but in the new currency—it would 
be the equivalent of a hundred-fold increase in wages. Howev-
er there is at least some evidence that the government is, in 
fact, pursuing such a policy, even if only in the short run or 
for favored sectors.9 Many workers were effectively employed 
outside of their work unit. A motive of the reform was to move 
them back into state-owned enterprises, potentially placing 
burdens on the firms. There is at least some evidence that 
the reform was accompanied by a progressive shift in salaries, 
6. Prices following the reforms and announcement of the first guidelines can 
be followed in North Korea Today No. 3/3- Hot Topics; No. 36 Hot 
Topics; and No. 36, all dated December 2009. 
7. “National Defense Commission’s Temporary Plan Indicated the Upper 
Limit for the Market Goods,” Open News for North Korea No. 2, December 
2, 2009. 
8. Kang I-ruk, “New Currency Issued in the DPRK: Currency Exchange 
Work in Progress—‘Policy to Benefit Hard-Working Workers’ Hailed by 
Majority of People,” Choso’n Sinbo Online, December 4, 2009 [in Korean].
9. See, in particular, North Korea Today No. 39, December 2009, which is 
devoted entirely to reporting on wages from different informants. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 0
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with lower-income workers getting pay raises and higher-paid 
workers cuts.20 Additional bonuses of 00 won per person 
were offered for each family member simply showing up at 
state-owned enterprises; this new policy constituted a one-
time transfer of 0,000 won per person in the old currency, 
a substantial sum. Later in December, reports surfaced that 
this “relief money” was being distributed in the name of Kim 
Chong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son and purported successor.
The currency conversion was followed by the passage of a 
raft of new laws, including on real estate, commodity consump-
tion, and imports.2 Although the details of these laws have 
not been released, they appear to be aimed at increasing state 
revenue, reducing the scope of transactions outside of the state 
sector, and exercising greater control over enterprises and other 
government units.22 For example, during the famine, work 
units were allowed to use real estate for the cultivation of food. 
Over time, however, authorities recognized that access to state 
land constituted a valuable asset and started to charge fees for 
its usage. The new law seeks to codify principles on the usage 
of private land and reassert the right of the state to relevant 
tax revenues, some of which were no doubt collected and kept 
by the work units themselves. The commodity consumption 
and import laws also appear designed to reassert control over 
interenterprise transactions, maintenance of inventories, and 
foreign trade—and foreign exchange earning—activities. 
A final set of issues surround trade and exchange rate 
dynamics. As we have seen, many currency conversions are 
accompanied by a fixing of the exchange rate to increase the 
credibility of a stabilization program and to provide a nominal 
anchor to the economy. In this case, however, there has been 
no official statement regarding the wildly overvalued official 
20. Lee Sung Jin, “First Salaries Since Redenomination Paid,” Daily NK, 
December 23, 2009. 
2. “N. Korea Establishes New Economic Laws Following Currency Change,” 
Yonhap News Agency, December 6, 2009. 
22. See Park In Ho, “New Industry and Real Estate Laws Enacted,” Daily NK, 
December 6, 2009; “North Korea Establishes Economic Laws Following 
Currency Reform,” Joongang Ilbo, December 6, 2009 [in Korean]. 
exchange rate, though one news report claimed that the offi-
cial won-dollar rate was being devalued to 3, in line with its 
preconversion black market rate.23 But confiscation changes 
how traders and even households think about their holdings 
of North Korean won and foreign currency. Residents are now 
more suspicious of holding won and thus put downward pres-
sure on the exchange rate, adding additional inflationary pres-
sures to the economy. One news report indicated that by the 
end of December, in the wake of the ban on foreign currencies, 
the postconversion black market won-yuan rate had reached 
,000 implying a won-dollar rate of more than 600,000 in 
preconversion terms!24 
In contrast to the effect of the conversion on prices, initial 
reports from the Chinese side of the border were sanguine 
because most trade—and certainly most official trade—was 
denominated  in  foreign  currency.  But  as  the  government 
delayed announcing its intentions with respect to the official 
exchange rate (and the tolerable black market rate), North 
Korean traders have had little choice but to withdraw purchase 
orders because of the difficulty of accessing US dollars and 
Chinese yuan—the two principal currencies in which North 
Korea’s trade is denominated. 
Even if trade is denominated in dollars or yuan North 
Korea managers and entrepreneurs, at least implicitly, have 
in their minds a “shadow price” for foreign exchange. If the 
result of the currency reform is to drive up the shadow price 
of foreign exchange (in effect, a devaluation of the won)—and 
the institutional mechanisms of production are not too badly 
damaged—North  Korean  exports  could  increase,  though 
not via the channel policymakers envisioned. Yet, whatever 
silver lining North Korea might realize on the export side is 
counterbalanced by the adverse effect depreciation will have 
on the prices of a variety of imported basic consumer goods, 
including food.
SO WHY DO IT?
A  central  theme  running  through  many  of  the  antimar-
ket reforms in North Korea over the last decade has been a 
discomfort with the market and the potential challenge to 
political  authority  that  it  represents. Whether  we  think  of 
cash holdings as an input to production in the private sector, 
the  equivalent  of  working  capital,  or  as  a  requirement  for 
private consumption (the “cash in advance” constraint), the 
confiscation of “surplus” cash and the concomitant reduction 
23. North Korea Newsletter No. 84, published by Yonhap News Agency, 
December 0, 2009.
24. “N. Korea’s New Currency Plummets Against Chinese Yuan: Report,” 
Yonhap News Agency, January 3, 200 [in Korean].
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in the money supply should have the effect of reducing private 
output. This  motivation—to  shift  the  economy  away  from 
autonomous private activity and toward organs under direct 
control of the state—is key.
The hope of the government is that this loss of private 
economic activity will be offset by the return of labor into the 
state-owned enterprise sector; indeed, this was clearly a motive 
of the reform and was even announced as such. Yet the reason 
that workers left the state-owned sector in the first place was 
that productivity and incomes were low, constrained by lack 
of inputs, the breakdown of the planning process and a myriad 
of managerial inefficiencies. There is no reason to believe that 
simply  moving  bodies  back  into  unproductive  state-owned 
enterprises will increase output; to the contrary, workers will 
even be a burden to their work units unless they are engaged 
in unofficial market activities (Park 2009). Ironically, given 
the inflationary concerns of the state, in the longer-run we 
can expect the supply constraint associated with the decline in 
private activity to put upward pressure on prices. 
More broadly, the effort to reconstitute the failing state 
sector is unlikely to work and will probably be counterproduc-
tive. Many firms were already engaged in activities outside of 
the plan, if only for sheer survival purposes. In the absence 
of state capacity to allocate resources, even the purchase of 
inputs  was  occurring  through  inter-company  bargains  that 
were largely outside the plan. As Hyeong Jung Park (2009, ) 
puts it, “the prerequisite of the success of this measure is the 
normalization of the national material supply system and the 
state-run consumer goods trading network at a stroke, which 
is far-fetched.”
The issuance of new guidelines does not mean that prices 
will obey the government’s will. To the contrary, the changes 
in relative prices and the uncertainty surrounding the entire 
conversion process have fueled, rather than dampened, infla-
tionary expectations. For example, rice prices that spiraled up 
during the conversion period have subsequently come down 
from their hyperinflationary levels, but still remain very much 
higher than they were prior to the conversion.2 Again, unan-
ticipated consequences are operating; given that holders of 
commodity inventories do not know what new prices might 
be, they have incentives to hoard. 
It is often argued that North Korea should follow the 
Chinese model, or that it is even beginning to do so. But the 
North Korean approach to economic policy since 200, and 
2. Two days after the closing of the conversion window, rice—which traded 
at ,700 to 2,000 won per kilo before the reform in old money, 7 won in the 
new—was trading in a range of 0 to as high as 80 in new won, still a very 
significant increase. Even after the announcement of the first round of price 
guidelines, rice was still trading at multiples of the old prices and as high as 
00 new won in some locations.
particularly since 2007, is essentially the reverse of the Chinese 
approach. In China, the market was allowed to “surround” 
the plan. Once plan obligations were fulfilled, production and 
consumption transactions occurred on market terms at the 
margin. Over time growth increasingly occurred in response 
to market signals, even with public ownership of the means 
of production. The North Koreans appear to want to do the 
opposite. Authorities are seeking to reduce the scope of decen-
tralized, market-oriented activity and are thus restricting the 
ability of the economy to respond to market signals and instead 
force development to occur according to state dictates. 
CRIME, RESISTANCE, AND PUNISHMENT
Confiscatory  currency  reforms  of  necessity  rest  ultimately 
on repression. Accounts coming from North Korea suggest 
that  the  authorities  recognized  that  the  conversion  would 
not be popular, and made efforts to explain the purposes of 
the reform through party functionaries. Leaving nothing to 
chance, however, the government clearly beefed up security 
around the time of the announcement. According to Daily 
NK’s sources inside the country, the People’s Safety Agency 
(PSA)  was  ordered  to  control  residents,  and  the  National 
Security Agency, Defense Security Command of the People’s 
Army, and army bases were all placed on standby.26 
The  repression  surrounding  the  currency  conversion  is 
part  of  a  longer-standing  trend  toward  the  criminalization 
of market activity (Haggard and Noland 2009c). Changes to 
the North Korean criminal code approved in 2004 and 2007 
include expansive definitions of economic crimes that, if taken 
literally, prohibit a wide range of standard commercial activi-
ties. This includes up to two years of “labor training” for indi-
viduals convicted of engaging in “illegal commercial activities, 
therefore gaining large profits.” The code also bars “illegally 
giving money or goods in exchange for labor.” Capital punish-
ment is to be meted out for “extreme cases” of theft of state 
property and for drug dealing, and increased punishments are 
prescribed for “illegally operating a business, such as a restau-
rant, motel, or store.”
Refugee surveys suggest that the repressive apparatus of the 
state is disproportionately targeting those involved in market-
oriented activities (Haggard and Noland 2009c). Participants 
in market activities were more than half again as likely to be 
detained as other citizens. Prisoners enduring a typical-length 
incarceration in a low-level “labor training center” often used to 
house economic criminals observed horrific abuses at astonish-
ing rates: execution (observed by 60 percent), forced starvation 
26. Lee Sung Jin, “Chaos Reigns after Currency ‘Trick,’”Daily NK, December 
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(90 percent), and death by torture or beating (20 percent).
This  repression  benefits  the  regime  in  many  ways. 
Among others, high levels of discretion with respect to deten-
tion and its associated abuses encourage bribery. The more 
arbitrary and painful the experience with the penal system, 
the easier it is for officials to extort money for avoiding it. 
These characteristics not only promote regime maintenance 
through intimidation but also facilitate predatory corruption. 
Given the growth in corruption in North Korea, it is almost a 
certainty that protected segments—in effect, mafias within the 
state—were able to shield their own profit-making activities 
from confiscation. (This phenomenon could become a prime 
source of contention if the government tries to enforce the 
ban on foreign currency holdings.) Thus one of the key social 
elements of the reform—to level incomes—is also not likely to 
be achieved; rather, the distributional consequences of reforms 
are likely to pit those who are protected through tight govern-
ment, party, or military connections from those who are not. 
A central question is whether the reform was so misguid-
ed as to spark unanticipated protests that would have broader 
political ramifications. Press coverage has been longer on hope 
in this regard than on specifics. At most we can probably expect 
everyday forms of low-level resistance and shirking rather than 
a frontal assault on state power.27 Some of this resistance will 
take the form of recourse back into the market economy. But 
North Korea entirely lacks civil society institutions capable of 
channeling mass discontent into constructive political action. 
At  present,  the  only  institution  capable  of  challenging  the 
regime is the military, which Kim Jong-il courts assiduously; 
presumably the government will tread carefully when enforc-
ing policies such as the ban on foreign currency that could 
adversely affect the interests of key constituencies. 
CONCLUSION
The North Korean currency reform is an economically misguided 
initiative that will reduce the welfare of North Korean residents. 
In the long run it is unlikely to even contribute significantly to 
the stated goal of rebuilding socialism. Such an effort is doomed 
to failure as long as the state lacks the resources and capacity 
to put goods on the shelves. Indeed, the second economy that 
the reform is trying to eradicate emerged in the first place as 
a response to state failure. Given the decision, one wonders if 
the regime has recourse to heretofore unrecognized sources of 
27. For example, “‘Women Power’ Gathers Against DPRK Currency Shock,” 
Chosun Ilbo, December 8, 2009, and other articles make reference to “protests” 
and even “riots” in response to the reforms, but these do not appear to be con-
firmed by subsequent reporting or were too small and localized to have wider 
effect. On “everyday forms of peasant resistance,” see Scott (98). 
funding or commodities that could allow the policy to succeed, 
or whether the policymakers who undertook the reform were 
simply unaware—or unconcerned—about its implications. 
The government has not been oblivious to the discontent 
raised by the reform and has undertaken a number of ad hoc 
adjustments that could be seen either as tactical retreats or 
as efforts to build support for the policy. For example, “relief 
money” and wage adjustments suggest efforts to portray the 
reform as a progressive one aimed at assisting workers and 
controlling prices, even if these objectives cannot be realized 
over the long run. It is likely that the government will seek to 
release stocks of food, including through foreign purchases, in 
order to alleviate political pressures in the short run. Reports 
even suggest that the government has sought to survey the 
citizenry on the effects of the reforms, presumably to gauge 
possible “camel’s straws” or breaking points that would gener-
ate  more  active  resistance.28  The  government’s  substantial 
propaganda machinery has also clearly been brought into play, 
emphasizing the equalizing effects of the reforms. 
However, there can be little question of the government’s 
determination to use controls and coercion as deemed neces-
sary.  The  dissemination  of  the  formal  edicts  outlining  the 
reforms was accompanied by orders requesting the maximum 
punishment to those who violate the rules of the currency 
exchange. Four days after the exchange was announced, orders 
were  apparently  issued  authorizing  that  those  attempting 
unauthorized  border  crossing  could  be  shot  on  sight.  Nor 
were these merely hypothetical; several reports have surfaced 
of executions of those seeking to circumvent the conversion 
limits or burning old bills.29 These more draconian actions are 
in addition to the surveillance and controls required to enforce 
new price guidelines and to stamp out market activities.
The sheer ruthlessness of the regime and its extraordi-
nary capacity for repression were probably a precondition for 
this reform. However, there is little evidence that the regime 
has succeeded in stamping out the market entirely. The very 
fact that the government has had to revert to tighter controls 
and repression, in fact, demonstrates the determined survival 
instincts  of  its  citizenry  and  the  resilience  of  the  market. 
One of the unintended consequences of the reform may be 
precisely to make the market a locus of political activity given 
the complete absence of other channels or civil society organi-
zations for expressing grievances.
28. North Korea Today No. 36 Hot Topics, December 2009. 
29. See, for example, North Korea Today No. 36, December 2009; and 
“North Korea Raises Limit for Currency Exchange,” Associated Press, Decem-
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